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Abstract
Mezirow’s theory of perspective transformation has proved to be a great asset 
to the scholarship of adult education and has provided a solid theoretical base 
for understanding complex learning phenomena. However, in the discussions 
surrounding Mezirow’s work, a certain “stuckness” appears which we think is 
unproductive. Critiques of Mezirow are often repeated, secondhand or thirdhand, 
causing important issues and tensions to become simplified and dichotomized, 
which causes complex aspects of the theory to lose the nuance that a good theory 
provides. This article draws on recent contributions to the literature in order to 
elaborate on the theory of perspective transformation in light of these recurring 
critiques. In so doing, we introduce three key concepts to the lexicon of perspective 
transformation: continuity, intersubjectivity, and emancipatory praxis. For each, we 
address the underlying omission or weakness in Mezirow’s theory and offer revised 
conceptualizations of the theory.
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Transformative learning is one of the most intensively researched theories in the field 
of adult education (Taylor, 2005, 2008; Taylor & Snyder, 2012). Over nearly four 
decades, it has evolved from Mezirow’s foundational work on perspective 
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transformation into a metatheory containing many individual approaches and theories 
(Hoggan, 2016). Not only was Mezirow’s theory of perspective transformation the 
seminal contribution to the broader concept of transformative learning, it arguably 
remains the most robust theoretical elucidation of learning in the whole corpus of lit-
erature concerned with transformative learning. The theory of perspective transforma-
tion has proved to be a great asset to the research and scholarship in the field of adult 
education which has provided a solid theoretical base for understanding complex 
learning phenomena.
Mezirow’s work has generated considerable dialogue and some heated debate. This 
is of course essential for the development of a theory so that ideas do not become rei-
fied but rather evolve into ever more refined, relevant, and useful explanations of 
learning. As scholars working with these ideas in very different places (the United 
States, Finland, and Ireland) and approaching transformative learning from different 
perspectives and with diverse but overlapping concerns, we think that Mezirow’s theo-
retical work offers vital insights into processes of learning and change on both an 
individual and collective level.
But we discern in the discussions of the value of Mezirow’s work a certain “stuck-
ness” which we think is unproductive. Critiques of Mezirow are now repeated, sec-
ondhand or thirdhand, causing important issues and tensions to become simplified and 
dichotomized (Cranton & Taylor, 2012; Mälkki, 2011). Complex aspects of perspec-
tive transformation, and the strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities for further theo-
retical development are therefore overlooked. In this article, we examine recurring 
criticisms of Mezirow’s theory of perspective transformation, criticisms that we see as 
falling into three categories: the personal, relational, and social aspects of learning. We 
synthesize these critiques and discuss ways they have been addressed in the literature. 
This article is aimed at both experienced and new researchers interested in Mezirow’s 
contribution to adult learning theory. It offers a summary of key points in Mezirow’s 
work as well as major issues of contention in the reception and development of his 
ideas. The article sketches out how some of these major issues and recurrent misunder-
standings might be fruitfully reframed.
In this article, perspective transformation refers to Mezirow’s (1990) theory of per-
spective transformation, as well as to
the process of becoming critically aware of how . . . we perceive, understand, and feel 
about our world; of reformulating these assumptions to permit a more inclusive, 
discriminating, permeable, and integrative perspective; and of making decisions or 
otherwise acting upon these new understandings. (p. 14)
We use the term transformative learning to refer more broadly to the metatheory that 
has grown out of Mezirow’s work, as well as to learning that is similarly related to 
Mezirow’s work (transformational) but not necessarily limited to his precise defini-
tion. As Hoggan (2016) describes, transformative learning refers broadly to “pro-
cesses that result in significant and irreversible changes in the way a person experiences, 
conceptualizes, and interacts with the world” (p. 71).
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In thinking with and against Mezirow (Finnegan, 2011), we see perspective trans-
formation as a generative, imperfect, but still relevant theory for adult education. This 
article is built around three key concepts: continuity, intersubjectivity, and emancipa-
tory praxis. The three concepts highlight distinct but overlapping aspects of perspec-
tive transformation which are linked to the personal, relational, and social aspects of 
learning. For each, we present the conceptualization, address the underlying omission 
or weakness in Mezirow’s theory, and offer revised conceptualizations of the theory 
which we hope will feed productive debate and perhaps unpick some theoretical knots.
Continuity
In talking about the importance of learning from experience, Dewey (1938) empha-
sized the principle of continuity, which states that there is a connection and interaction 
between one’s past, present, and future experiences. Even a significant transforma-
tional experience does not completely sever or act independently of this connection 
and interaction. The notion of continuity, while not explicit, is manifested in Mezirow’s 
(1991a, 2000) conceptualization of perspective transformation: Meaning perspectives 
that are formed by previous experiences in our social contexts, filter the way we make 
meaning of our present and future experiences, and in this process the continuity is 
realized as the past, present, and future interact in the continuous flow of experiencing 
and interpreting. However, when one is not able to make meaning of the present expe-
rience based on past experiences and the meaning perspectives derived from them, a 
disorienting dilemma occurs (Mezirow, 1990). Thus, the continuous flow between 
past, present, and future is momentarily broken down. This does not mean that the 
entirety of the meaning perspective collapses, but that a temporary break in the conti-
nuity regarding some aspect of one’s life has occurred. And this break is significant 
enough that it cannot be ignored as just some irrelevant problem; it must be dealt with. 
The principle of continuity is consistent with Mezirow’s (1981) definition of a mean-
ing perspective as “the structure of psycho-cultural assumptions within which new 
experience is assimilated and transformed by one’s past experience” (p. 6). The fol-
lowing sections address issues addressed by the principle of continuity.
The False Dichotomy of Transformation
According to Mezirow (1991b), perspective transformation is about significant change 
in one’s meaning perspectives, or those interpretive frameworks used to making mean-
ing of our experiences. Meaning perspectives are thus portrayed as the object of reflec-
tion, as there are taken-for-granted assumptions within our meaning perspectives that 
are untrue or inadequate and therefore in need of revision. What often goes unnoticed 
in the literature is that the meaning perspectives first and foremost function to take care 
of our need for coherence and continuity, which are necessary to understand our sur-
roundings and maintain a coherent worldview in general (Mälkki, 2010, 2011; Mälkki 
& Green, 2014; Mezirow, 2000). Although some parts of a meaning perspective might 
undergo significant change, all of one’s meaning perspectives would of course not 
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simultaneously transform. In fact, if this were even possible, it would be quite cata-
strophic for human functioning. One implication of this acknowledgment is that the 
scholars should explicitly address the role and interactions of existing meaning per-
spectives as they continue throughout and beyond the transformative learning process.
Despite the stabilizing effect of existing meaning structures, in our daily lives we are 
in constant interaction with our surroundings. We project our assumptions onto the 
world in order to make sense of our experiences. In so doing we modify and adjust 
those assumptions according to the encounters we have with reality. Therefore, we 
could say that there is a slight and tacit process of modification of meaning perspectives 
happening on a regular basis. Furthermore, the way our meaning perspectives are pro-
jected in each situation varies according to the situation. That is, different sides of a 
person are shown with different people based on the expectations and previous experi-
ences. Some scholars have pointed to this state of constant adjustment and deduced that 
because of it there is nothing to distinguish transformative learning from any other type 
of learning (Newman, 2012). If a distinction exists, it is important to clarify what it is.
To help illustrate the distinction that we believe does exist between transformative 
learning and other forms of learning, we point to Piaget and his work on childhood 
development. Piaget (1954) noted two complimentary processes of human develop-
ment: assimilation and accommodation. Assimilation refers to incremental learning, 
whereby experiences inform one’s understanding of the world but do not change the 
underlying meaning-making structure. In contrast, through accommodation, the 
underlying structures change in order to adapt to one’s experiences. Piaget noted fur-
ther that accommodation can be a difficult and painful process. In drawing from 
Piaget’s work to describe similar processes in transformation, the distinction between 
common instances of learning and transformation is the extent to which the learning 
affects the underlying meaning-making structures. One suggestion is that transforma-
tive learning differs from everyday learning in its depth, breadth, and relative stability 
(Hoggan, 2016). The concept of depth refers to the degree to which a learning experi-
ence affects a particular part of one’s meaning perspective; minor changes with mini-
mal affects to one’s meaning perspective do not merit the descriptor of transformation. 
Breadth refers to the contexts in which change is manifest and implies that a transfor-
mation affects meaning-making in many if not all of the contexts in which a person 
interacts with the world, whereas everyday learning experiences usually affect only a 
limited number of contexts. Last, the criterion of relative stability insists that change 
cannot be temporary if it is to be considered transformational. These criteria resonate 
with Mezirow’s (2000) description of transformative outcomes that result in meaning 
perspectives that are more critically reflective, integrative of experience, open, and so 
forth. Namely, they refer to changes in the general properties of meaning perspectives 
rather than a content-specific change. Scholars should not describe perspective trans-
formation as either having happened or not, but rather talk in terms of the degree to 
which changes in meaning perspective demonstrate depth, breadth, and relative stabil-
ity, and thus the extent to which they are transformative.
Also, although it is easier to talk about perspective transformation as if there are 
finite beginnings and endings of the learning, from a temporal perspective it is more 
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accurate to talk about overlapping trajectories of transformation. Small instances of 
disorientation may begin a slow, cumulative yet strong process of change. Furthermore, 
the end of one change process is often a stimulus for something new. The resolution of 
a dilemma creates new dilemmas, especially as the learner interacts in a variety of 
social surroundings (Malinen, 2000; Mälkki, 2012; Mezirow, 2000). From the per-
spective of continuity, whether a transformation has happened appears as a simplistic 
question, one that is undeniably tempting and engaging but that does not do justice to 
the phenomenon in reality. The outcomes of transformative learning are inseparable 
from the learner’s previous experiences, existing meaning structures, and processes of 
learning. Although it is important from a scholarly perspective to have parameters that 
determine whether a learning experience should be considered an instance of transfor-
mative learning, it is more accurate and beneficial to focus on the extent of transforma-
tion and the exact ways in which it is manifest.
Transformation as a Goal of Education
Transformative learning has for decades been viewed as something more profound, 
more critical, and more empowering than other forms of learning. The promise is that 
it allows one to critically move beyond those seemingly self-evident assumptions gov-
erning one’s thinking, feeling, and acting that have been unquestioningly internalized 
through socialization and education. Any educational effort designed to foster such 
profound change at the individual or societal level will be fraught with ethical dilem-
mas (Brockett, 1988), and many scholars have written about the ethical considerations 
surrounding transformative learning (Ettling, 2012). We suggest two facets of the 
theory that should be considered: underlying premises of normativity and the conse-
quences of transformation.
Normativity. Normativity refers to the fact that the end-state of transformation as envi-
sioned by the educator may not seem ideal from other perspectives. What is seen as 
positive learning by some may appear as indoctrination, radicalization, or some other 
negative outcome by others.
Underlying the perceived need for other people to change in fundamental ways are 
a host of normative values; in essence, we work to change people such that they match 
our values and views of the world. For instance, one of the intended outcomes of 
Mezirow’s perspective transformation is that learners become more autonomous in 
their ways of knowing. Implicit in this goal is the value of individual autonomy. This 
value reflects Mezirow’s cultural and intellectual background and is not necessarily 
universal across all cultures. And yet, what is education for if not to change people? 
Are we supposed to sit idly by without trying to make a difference in people’s lives or 
to make the world a better place simply because there likely will never be a universal 
consensus about what “better” entails? “There is a strong ideological dimension to this 
question of challenging and transforming the consciousness of students” (Shor & 
Freire, 1987, p. 174, cited in Ettling, 2012). Addressing the issue of normativity begins 
with reflecting on the ideologies and values implicit in our educational goals.
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Within the discussions on transformative learning, there seems to be a shared 
understanding that it yields positive outcomes. However, the goals of transforma-
tion in terms of specific outcomes are largely ignored and in need of critical review; 
various scholars have very different expectations for the outcomes of transforma-
tive learning (see Hoggan, 2016). Transformative learning is thus brought together 
with other sets of theoretical concepts or policy values without necessarily consid-
ering the consequences of this theoretical marriage. We are here challenged to con-
sider whether by defining a transformative learning theory, we can predefine and 
restrict the topics or outcomes involved. Mezirow (2000) was careful in conceptu-
alizing the nature of transformative outcomes in rather general terms (i.e., that 
meaning perspectives becoming more critically reflective, open, discerning, etc.), 
thereby positioning perspective transformation as a process leading to an open-
ended, qualitative improvement in one’s meaning making, without restricting the 
objects of reflections.
The question is, then, is transformation about acquiring certain viewpoints or about 
developing certain depth and criticality of thinking? Indeed, to promote perspective 
transformation without an ideological outcome would likely be impossible, as the pro-
cesses of learning have embedded ideological values and by their very design lead to 
particular types of outcomes. In the end, any act of facilitating or influencing is not 
without values, but educators should be clear about the actual values orienting their 
thinking, feeling, and acting as pedagogues. This is especially crucial when there is 
assessment involved that in itself brings about an implicit or explicit priority of desired 
learning outcomes (see Cranton & Hoggan, 2012; Mälkki, 2011).
Consequences. The issue of consequences refers to the potential negative effects of 
perspective transformation, including the difficulties of the process and consequences 
of dramatic personal change (see Berger, 2004; Brookfield, 1994; Mälkki, 2010; 
Mälkki & Green, 2014). For instance, Brookfield (1994) writes of cultural suicide, 
which describes how learners can be cut off from important social groups as a result of 
dramatic change. Berger (2004) suggests that if we called our transformative educa-
tional programs initiatives of catastrophic disorganization, it would offer a more truth-
ful image of the learning process and its associated risks. Thus, it is problematic to 
position perspective transformation as the ideal or best form of learning in every situ-
ation. Neither Mezirow nor most scholars explicitly claim that it is; nevertheless, the 
vast majority of the literature is silent about the appropriateness or possible inappro-
priateness of transformative learning in particular situations. We need to be more criti-
cally aware and explicit about the costs and consequences involved for the learners we 
aim to transform.
For perspective transformation to be effectively facilitated in educational programs, 
advocates of transformation should be thoughtful of and attentive to the consequences 
of what such a process means for the individual and in relation to the institution. By 
the former, we refer to what is the nature of the process that they are facilitating with 
all its joys and struggles for the individual undergoing the learning process both in the 
cognitive, social, and emotional spheres (see Mälkki & Green, 2014). By the latter, we 
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refer to how the struggles of transformation may be unnecessarily accentuated if the 
facilitator is blind to the power of the educational institution and the influence of such 
power on the extent to which learners are able to choose whether to engage in learning 
processes that may yield dramatic results in their personal lives. Participants often 
enroll in educational programs for instrumental rather than transformational purposes. 
Granted, there may be motivations or deeper yearnings that are transformative in 
nature and that are also prompting the choice to enroll. Nevertheless, it is one thing to 
recognize the potential of an educational program to promote transformative learning, 
but it is a much different thing to require and evaluate it. The latter is not necessarily 
unethical, but it is usually at least problematic.
In applying the principle of continuity to the theory of perspective transformation, 
several implications emerge. First, no transformative experience will affect the entirety 
of the learner’s meaning perspectives. Therefore, it becomes necessary to clarify 
exactly how meaning perspectives have changed. A second implication is that no ped-
agogical design can determine the learning outcome independent of the learner’s expe-
rience and existing meaning structures. There is a complex interaction between 
existing meaning structures, the specific experiences causing a disorienting dilemma, 
the epistemology used to negotiate new meaning structures, and the eventual transfor-
mational outcome (Hoggan, 2014). A third implication is that not all meaning perspec-
tives are in need of change; the stabilizing affect of existing meaning perspectives is 
important (Mälkki, 2010, 2011; Mälkki & Green, 2014; Mezirow, 2000). Also, educa-
tors should be transparent about their intended learning outcomes, and care should be 
taken such that participants have legitimate options not-to-transform without hurting 
their progress in the educational program. Furthermore, special care and support 
should be offered when transformational outcomes are anticipated.
Intersubjectivity
The second problematic issue addressed in this article relates to the false dichotomiza-
tions between cognitive and emotional and the individual and social. Our conceptual-
ization is premised on the notion that the human experience is first and foremost 
intersubjective. It is impossible to separate cognition from emotion, just as it is to 
completely separate the individual from the social.
Mezirow’s focus on individual change has been the topic of several criticisms, 
which argue that he fails to take into account the issues of the individual in relation to 
context and issues of collective action (Collard & Law, 1989). Mezirow (1989) argues 
that collective action is only justifiable when it is learner-instigated based on critical 
assessment of the assumptions as its basis. While we acknowledge the relevance of 
their argument, discussions related to Collard and Law’s (1989) critique on the indi-
vidualism of the theory have actually promoted the conceptualization of perspective 
transformation as a solipsistically individual and rational process, to the extent that it 
is not congruent with what Mezirow actually wrote. In the following sections, we 
elaborate on the relation between cognition and emotions, as well as between the 
individual and the social.
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Cognition and Emotion
One of the most frequent criticisms of Mezirow’s theory has been the emphasis on 
cognition and rationality at the expense of emotions. Some of this criticism stems from 
the empirical studies that highlight emotions as an important aspect of transformative 
learning process (Taylor, 1997). However, Mezirow’s theory does not ignore the influ-
ence of emotions as is often claimed. Some of the basic premises of the theory refer to 
emotions, and Mezirow mentions emotions in several instances in his writings (Mälkki, 
2010). Nevertheless, criticisms of the cognitive emphasis of the theory are justifiable 
in the sense that the nature, role, and origins of emotions are not considered explicitly 
in the theory but remain rather in a subordinate role, whereas the elaboration on the 
cognitive aspects of learning are brought to the fore (Mälkki, 2010). Emotions are 
more than mere addenda to the learning process or barriers to rational thought; they 
can instigate the learning process and lead to more holistic ways of knowing and being 
(Dirkx, 2008; Lawrence, 2008; Mälkki, 2012).
Building on Mezirow’s theory by utilizing Damasio’s (1999) neurological theory of 
consciousness and emotions, Mälkki (2010) introduced the concepts of edge-emotions 
and comfort zone to explain the dynamics of cognition and emotion in the workings of 
meaning perspectives, as well as the challenges and possibilities to reflect and trans-
form them. These concepts elaborate the experiential aspect of the unpleasant feelings 
that are common in perspective transformation and highlight the tendencies that these 
emotions bring about. Namely, just as emotions orient us to avoid danger and tacitly 
search for safety and comfort in our interactions with the environment (Damasio, 
1999), emotions also function to maintain continuity and coherence of our meaning 
perspectives and sense of self (Mälkki, 2010). When our meaning perspectives are 
intact, we feel comfortable and secure in the world; we are in a comfort zone. When 
challenged, our efforts to reflect on our meaning perspectives are faced with an auto-
matic resistance. We feel unpleasant emotions—edge-emotions—such as hurt, shame, 
frustration, depression, anger, or fear. The edge-emotions tacitly orient our thinking to 
return to the comfort zone, and we tend to avoid dealing with the questioned assump-
tions by explaining the situation in ways that allow us to avoid facing the need to reas-
sess and revise them. As the problematized assumptions are guarded by these 
unpleasant edge-emotions, it is yet through these emotions that we can gain access to 
dealing with those assumptions. That is, instead of striving to avoid unpleasant edge-
emotions and return to the comfort zone as soon as possible, it may be helpful or per-
haps necessary to embrace or at least accept the unpleasant emotions for perspective 
transformation to occur (Mälkki, 2010, 2011).
Individual and Social
According to Mezirow, meaning perspectives develop out of the interaction, culture, 
and language of one’s social contexts. Thus, meaning perspectives can be seen as 
unique compilations of shared social resources (Mälkki & Green, 2014). In this sense, 
individuals and identities are fundamentally relational and do not exist independent of 
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their social contexts. The shared nature of meaning perspectives creates social bonds 
between people and through this bond they can experience feeling accepted by others. 
When an individual reflects on their private meanings, they are at the same time chal-
lenging the social bonds that bind them with the like-minded (Mälkki, 2012). While 
meaning perspectives function to serve the coherence and continuity that we fundamen-
tally need in order to survive and maintain a coherent mental life, they also serve to 
maintain our social connections and the fundamental feeling of belonging and being 
accepted by others. Some scholars have pointed out that people fundamentally are born 
premature and are in constant yearning of social connection and just cannot cope alone, 
without others, without the support of others (West, Fleming, & Finnegan, 2013). When 
we reflect on our meanings and challenge our assumptions, we are at the same time 
playing with this fundamental threat of being rejected or excluded (Mälkki, 2011).
As our meaning perspectives function to keep us in the familiar lines of thinking and 
interpreting as our social groups, we exist in a comfort zone where nothing challenges 
our meanings, values, social connections, and acceptance (Mälkki, 2010, 2011). In con-
trast, unpleasant edge-emotions emerge when these meanings, values, and social con-
nections become challenged. Consequently, a collective comfort zone exists wherein 
people protect their collective meaning perspectives to stay in the comfort zone; they 
avoid voicing critical comments or viewpoints that might be challenging the harmoni-
ous atmosphere of the group or one’s sense of being accepted (Mälkki, 2011).
Alternatively, the social context can be an aid for reflection by creating space for 
sketching alternative interpretations and challenging the givens, if there is a safe and 
accepting atmosphere that supports this critical questioning process (see Mezirow, 
1991a). That is, if we already feel that we are accepted, even with our flaws, there is 
less of a defense against becoming aware of our assumptions (Mälkki, 2011). In this 
accepting atmosphere, we may even be more able to reflect than we would be able to 
on our own, where we would have to maintain the image of those accepting us, and we 
could not be sure whether they would actually accept us with all our new insights and 
questionings.
Emancipatory Praxis
Some of the most long-standing and sharpest debates about perspective transforma-
tion have been about its claim to be an emancipatory form of adult education (Clark 
& Wilson, 1991; Collard & Law, 1989; Hart, 1990; Inglis, 1997; Murray, 2013; 
Newman, 1994; and in response to some of these critics Mezirow, 1989, 1991b, 1994, 
1997). In these discussions, Mezirow (1990) repeatedly asserted that challenging 
domination, fighting for social justice, and deepening democracy are integral to adult 
education and to his theory of perspective transformation. But critics discern major 
flaws in Mezirow’s theory and have argued that it offers an inadequate account of 
power. In recent years, some radical critics (Murray, 2013; Newman, 2012) have even 
suggested that scholars need to abandon discussions of transformative learning alto-
gether and seek a different conceptual framework and vocabulary for discussing sig-
nificant learning. These recent interventions by Murray and Newman have added to 
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a long-standing, rich, and informative debate. But more commonly, the question of 
the value of perspective transformation as an emancipatory theory of adult education 
has become ritualistic and rhetorical and often degenerated into rather predictable 
defenses or denunciations of Mezirow’s work. This part of the article will seek to 
move beyond the well-established and reified terms of this discussion and make the 
argument that Mezirow’s work—despite significant gaps—remains an important 
resource for adult educators committed to emancipation (Finnegan, 2011, 2014b). To 
do this, we will briefly situate Mezirow in a broader intellectual landscape, outline 
how Mezirow understands emancipatory learning, assess the strengths and weak-
nesses of perspective transformation in this regard, and then finally suggest how 
Mezirow’s ideas might usefully be reframed within a more explicitly differentiated 
theory of personal and collective emancipatory transformations.
It is important—even necessary—to begin by placing transformative learning 
within a longer history and a broader tradition in philosophy, politics, and adult educa-
tion. Specifically, many of the major premises and the normative commitments that 
underpin Mezirow’s way of thinking about knowledge, learning, and social action can 
be clearly traced back to other emancipatory theories of praxis. Praxis is a term with a 
complex genealogy with roots in Greek philosophy, but the version that feeds directly 
into Mezirow’s theory of perspective transformation was articulated first, with great 
lapidary force, by Marx (1888). This has been elaborated and advanced in various 
ways by critical theorists, radical educators, and activists since then. In Mezirow’s 
case, these ideas have been absorbed into his theory through the work of the Brazilian 
educator Paulo Freire (1970) and through the German critical theorist Jurgen Habermas 
(1984). The praxis orientation in perspective transformation has also been informed by 
Dewey’s approach to experience, critical thinking, and democracy, as well as some 
aspects of psychoanalysis.
So what are the characteristics of an emancipatory theory of praxis? First, the defin-
ing aim of such a theory is to reflect and act on the world in a way that expands human 
freedom. It is of the utmost importance that theory and action are seen as being in 
dialectical relationship with each other. Furthermore, this orientation requires close 
attention to the logic of practice in a given sociohistorical context and seeks through 
critical thought to break with the giveness of practices and ideas. Praxis entails a spe-
cific type of epistemic break: a rupture which involves a double movement of critical 
negation and creative exploration. This critical distance allows individual and collec-
tive subjects to deepen their rational understanding of the structural forces which give 
rise to the order of things. Through this activity, we can then begin to identify possi-
bilities for action that increase human well-being. This often—but not always—neces-
sitates an explicit rejection and critique of dominant ideologies and social relations 
which unnecessarily harm or hinder human development. This is premised on the 
belief that it takes sustained critical effort “to prevent mankind [sic] from losing itself 
in those ideas and activities which the existing organization of society instills into its 
members” (Horkheimer, 2002, p. 265). To think against the grain is not sufficient: It is 
rational thought and action orientated to equality and freedom that defines an emanci-
patory theory of praxis. These concepts inform a great deal of adult education 
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literature and has helped crystallize a question which is central, even constitutive, of 
the field of adult education: “How can open-ended inquiry and reflexive learning 
linked to a commitment to equality be used by individuals, groups and movements to 
maintain and transform culture in a way that expands human freedom?”
We want to argue that this question is also at the heart of perspective transforma-
tion. From a historical perspective, we think the theory can be readily characterized as 
a specific version of praxis theory adapted to the culture and needs of the field of adult 
education at a particular period of time. What is significant is the precise way Mezirow 
understands emancipatory praxis. In fact, we believe it is by tracing the emphases, 
specific form, and theoretical gaps in Mezirow’s work that we can begin to move 
beyond “either/or” thinking about it as a praxis theory.
Mezirow (1991b) describes praxis simply as the “creative implementation of pur-
pose” (p. 12). He believes the most valuable form of praxis—perspective transforma-
tion—begins with the exploration and rational reconstruction of our frames of 
references. We can overcome epistemic, psychological, and sociolinguistic distortions 
in our frames of reference through reflection facilitated by collaborative discourse, and 
thus create the possibility to think and act differently. If we look carefully at the way 
Mezirow describes this process, it becomes clear that perspective transformation is a 
fascinating theoretical synthesis which brings together the radical, collectivist notion of 
praxis offered by Freire with more individualistic conceptions of critical awareness 
derived from studies of critical thinking and adult development. What bridges the con-
cern with Freirean conscientisation, the process of developing deeper, more critical and 
highly agentic forms of social awareness, with a humanist concern with self-actualiza-
tion is, we would argue, an ethical commitment to participatory democracy derived 
from Habermas and Dewey. Both forms of praxis—individual and collective—result in 
perspective transformation and contribute to a rational and democratic society. In fact, 
Mezirow (1990, 1991a, 2007) repeatedly links deep forms of critical reflection by indi-
viduals to the active construction of democratic spaces of learning. Such efforts are 
envisaged as having a cumulative power: enhanced individual autonomy, the creation 
of spaces of deliberation and reflection, and the practice of participatory democracy 
together provide the soundest basis for enhancing social freedom.
Significantly, Mezirow (1989, 1990) also stresses that perspective transformation is 
something that may or may not be linked to emancipatory social action. This makes his 
theory quite distinct from most other praxis theories such as Freire (1970) who argue 
that there is a necessary connection between transformative learning and social change 
which links deep forms of critical reflection to a collective capacity to “read the world” 
and then act on this understanding. In many respects, this partial decoupling of indi-
vidual transformation from social transformation is useful. First of all, it offers con-
ceptual tools for understanding important types of learning experiences that have 
liberatory effects, such as for example, finding new terms for understanding the expe-
rience of bereavement (Mälkki, 2012; Sands & Tennant, 2010). Such learning does not 
entail extended ideological critique or collective political praxis but can contribute to 
freedom and human flourishing. This might be usefully termed as one form of eman-
cipatory biographical praxis. Treating such deep learning as either inconsequential or 
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just a subset of explicitly political praxis risks flattening out social life and ignoring 
many of the attachments and concerns that are central to our lives. Of course there are 
also forms of emancipatory biographical praxis where ideological critique and partici-
pation in collective activity are important. A powerful example of this sort of emanci-
patory praxis in recent history comes from the women’s movement. The point here is 
that there is a wide range of forms of biographical praxis which might be usefully 
explored and enhanced through perspective transformation.
There is also reason to believe that such biographical praxis has assumed a new 
importance in late modernity. Arguably, the conditions under which we reflect and act 
in the world have radically altered over the past 40 years. Specifically, there is consid-
erable evidence of a decisive shift in modern society toward detraditionalized, highly 
individualized, and fluid societies in which a specific form of reflexive action, the 
change and transformation of the self, is highly valued and perhaps even become an 
imperative (Alheit & Dausien, 2000; Beck, 1992). More than ever, we are asked to 
devise or discover satisfactory biographical solutions to the challenges that result from 
rapid and ceaseless social change. Of course there is no reason to believe that the 
demand to act in a biographically reflexive way is necessarily emancipatory (Alheit & 
Dausien, 2000). On the contrary, the dominant mode of biographical reflexivity, which 
is highly individualized, Richard Sennett (1998) believes, is both a symptom and 
cause of a “corrosion of character”; by which he means the demand to invent and rein-
vent oneself to be endlessly flexible leads to atomization, loneliness, and a felt lack of 
solidarity. Nevertheless, we need as educators to be able to respond to this demand in 
emancipatory fashion. In the current context, we need to be willing “to cut a passage 
through the thicket of new and yet unexplored life realities” (Bauman & Tester, 2001, 
p. 13), and we would argue that perspective transformation is particularly useful for 
grasping and exploring the dilemmas of modern biographical praxis in a satisfactory 
way (Illeris, 2014). It offers a theory which suggests how and under what circum-
stances such challenges can be used to create way of feeling, thinking, being, and act-
ing that are more rational, open, discriminating, and integrative.
One of the enduring strengths of perspective transformation then is that it invites 
educators from the praxis tradition to think about emancipatory learning on a variety 
of scales and in relation to a variety of purposes. This remains an important develop-
ment in praxis-orientated adult learning theory. However, the way Mezirow frames 
this and explains the sequence and value of what we have called biographical praxis to 
other forms of praxis is problematic in several respects. Namely, he treats it as the 
primary goal of adult education and as the prerequisite of all other forms of praxis, and 
this argument is given considerable force by the way perspective transformation in 
general is framed. Despite it being anchored to arguments about the centrality of inter-
subjective communication and consistently stating that informed action and higher 
levels of autonomy require collaboration and dialogue, the overwhelming focus is 
change on an individual level. It is worth noting that Mezirow’s interpretation of 
Habermas downplays the role the latter gives to social forces. The result is that 
Mezirow systematically underestimates the socially structured, mediated, and contex-
tual nature of both learning and social action (Clark & Wilson, 1991; Cunningham, 
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1998) and this leaves his theory insufficiently equipped to fully explain the dynamics 
and logic of social power (Inglis, 1997). Although the sociocultural and sociological 
aspects of learning are constantly alluded to in one form or other, social relations are 
rarely placed center stage and are given much less space than theories of adult and ego 
development in his work. We can see this, for instance, in his quite cursory treatment 
of the issues of employment, class, social movements, and to the patterns and sources 
of collective agency from below. This leads Mezirow to claim that democratic collec-
tive praxis can only follow individually achieved transformation. But social movement 
studies, biographies, and everyday experience suggest the processes are very complex 
and that there is no fixed linear sequence in how people become agentic and how his-
torical change occurs (Horton, 2003; Tilly, 2004). It also offers no clear way of distin-
guishing between the value of education that leads to enhanced autonomy for 
individuals and forms of education that contribute to greater social freedom. These are 
quantitatively and qualitatively distinct—if linked—phenomena.
In summary, a sociological deficit, a tendency to methodological individualism, and 
a disregard of how social change occurs in complex mediated patterns leaves the ques-
tion of how perspective transformation may or may not be linked to wider social change 
undertheorized. This has meant that some writers who are more attuned to the specifici-
ties and importance of collective praxis encounter perspective transformation as thin 
and unconvincing (Murray, 2013) and has led some commentators to, incorrectly in our 
view, conclude that it is a liberal rather than an emancipatory theory of learning.
If this analysis is correct and perspective transformation is a version of a praxis 
theory that has great explanatory power in certain respects but also has major weak-
nesses, the question to be addressed is whether there is a way around this theoretical 
impasse. We believe there is. This entails actively working between perspective trans-
formation and other theories of praxis and clearly differentiating learning processes 
according to their scope, intensity, and the extent to which various modes of reflexive 
activity enhance intentional action and autonomy and allow us to reorganize social 
practices in an emancipatory fashion. Both collectivist and individualist views benefit 
from each other, as any view alone is always insufficient in understanding such com-
plex human phenomena. By bringing perspective transformation into dialogue with a 
longer tradition of thinking about praxis, we wish to suggest that we can usefully dis-
tinguish between (a) reflexively adaptive learning, (b) emancipatory forms of praxis 
which occur on a biographical level, and (c) those types of praxis capable of effecting 
emancipatory institutional and social change. In this schema types, two and three are 
interrelated and interdependent but the links between them and the sequence they fol-
low are contingent. This sketch requires greater elaboration but does offer a first step 
beyond the either/or approach taken to transformative learning as an emancipatory 
theory (Finnegan, 2014a).
Conclusion
Mezirow provided the field of adult education with a solid theoretical foundation in 
his theory of perspective transformation. The theory spawned a deluge of research 
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and dialogue, the likes of which have rarely been seen in our field. As the inevitable 
critiques of his work emerged, Mezirow continued to develop his theory (Kitchenham, 
2008). Nevertheless, despite this ongoing development, there still exist many facets 
of perspective transformation that are undertheorized. This article provides elabora-
tion on some of these facets that we feel are problematic by introducing or synthesiz-
ing from the literature a number of concepts. Continuity, normativity, and 
consequences provide theoretical explication for more nuanced and explicit discus-
sions about the processes and outcomes of perspective transformation, as well as the 
ideological underpinnings and potential ramifications of transformative learning. 
The concepts of intersubjectivity, edge-emotions, and comfort zone provide for 
more holistic understandings of perspective transformation as a phenomenon that is 
not and indeed could not be a purely rational or individual process. Last, the con-
cepts of emancipatory practice and biographical praxis help position it as an eman-
cipatory theory of praxis that encompasses but is not restricted to emancipatory 
institutional and social change. These concepts contribute to the lexicon of perspec-
tive transformation theory and provide scholars with conceptual tools with which to 
further research and develop the theory.
We hope our article stimulates and encourages further theoretical analysis, refine-
ment, and development on the theory of perspective transformation, in the spirit of 
broadening and deepening understanding by utilizing criticism as a source and stimu-
lation for further development. To understand perspective transformation as a theory 
in progress, as Mezirow (2000) suggested, and to keep it under continuous critical 
continuous questioning and development (Mezirow, 1991a), we believe best facilitates 
the development of transformative and emancipatory praxis.
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